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W.: Negotiable Instruments--Usury--Latches

flECENT CASE COMMENTS
linquished.13 However, the proposition that there may be a shifting of liability with the relinquishment of the right of exclusive
control Idoes not alter the remaining fact that there may be two or
more masters of the same servant at the same time for the same
act. 4 Where such is the case the weight of authority seems to
point that there may be joint and several liability upon such joint
masters for the negligent injuries to strangers caused by that servant. 5
H. G. W.

In 1925
LACES. USURY NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS P, for a loan of $10,000 from the Mortgage Security Corporation
of America, gave sixteen six per cent notes and seven subordinate
non-intere'st bearing notes covering certain fees for guaranteeing
the notes, obtaining the guarantee of another surety company, and
for servicing. Both series of notes were secured by a deed of trust
on the property which was improved by the money borrowed. P
made payments for almost eight years which paid the semi-annual
interest to all note holders and retired all the notes but six which
were of the principal series. These six notes were then in the hands
of defendants, holders in due course. Both guarantors of the notes
had become insolvent. P, having defaulted, brought this suit to
enjoin the apprehended sale of the property under the deed of trust
and to purge the loan of usury. The lower court found that the
sum evidenced by the subordinate notes with- the exception of a
few small items was in fact usurious interest charged and gave a
decree against the mortgage company (insolvent) for the amount
of the usury and interest, dismissing the suit as to the other defendants. On appeal, affirmed. Held, one justice dissenting, that
the principal and subordinate notes all having been given for one
consideration are all tainted with usury; that although the defense of usury is applicable against a holder in due course, P is
,13 Central R. of N. J. v. DeBusley, 261 Fed. 561 (C. C. A. 3d, 1919);
Bart6lomeo v. Bennett Co., 245 N. Y. 66, 256 N. E. 98 (1927); Charles v.
Barret, 233 N. Y. 127, 135 N. E. 199 (1922).
14 Moore v. Southern Ry. Co., 165 N. C. 439, 81 S. E. 603 (1914) ; Brow v.
Boston & A. R. Co., 157 Mass. 399, 32 N. E. 362 (1892).
is Brow v. Boston & A. R. Co., 157 Mass. 399, 32 N. E. 362 (1892); White
v. Fitchburg R. Co., 136 Mass. 321 (1884); Williams v. Southern R. Co., 102
Miss. 617, 59 So. 850 (1912) ; Molling v. Barnard, 65 Mo. App. 601 (1896) ;
Moore v. Southern R. Co., 165 N. C. 439, 81 S. E. 603 (1.914); American Cotton Co. v. Simmons; 39 Tex. Civ. App. 189, 87 S. W. 842 (1905).
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precluded by his laches from asserting the defense. Hall v. Mortgage Security Corporation of America.'
The equities of a holder in due course seem greatly to outweigh the equities of the borrower who is at most the innocent party
who made possible the suffering. However, there is to be balanced
with this, the state's policy against usury evidenced by statutes
that declare the usurious interest absolutely void,2 allow purging
of the usury before its payment, 3 and even recovery of it after payment' with no special statute of limitations imposed 5 To preserve
the concept that the usurious interest is absolutely void, our court,
in Eskridge v. Twmas,' has held that even as against an innocent
purchaser for value, the defense lies notwithstanding the Negoti7
able Instruments Law.
The court in the principal case holds that the defense of usury
is good as against innocent holders but takes all force from the
argument by holding in effect that because the rights of innocent
parties have intervened the defense cannot be used. If this be
followed, the defense may never be used"in cases of this nature
against a holder in due course because the borrower by not suing
to purge before that person bought his note is barred by his laches,
the rights of a third party have intervened.
The reasoning on. which the courts hold the Negotiable Instruments Law inapplicable to the defense of usury is that a usurious
note being void in whole or in part is to that extent a mere nullity
in whosesoever hands it is; that to hold otherwise would make the
statute which presumes to make it void itself a nullity.8 The court
1192 S. E. 145, dissent, p. 393 (W. Va. 1937).
§ 6.
3As defense, id. at § 7; basis for action, id. at § 8.
41d. at § 9.
5Mr. J. KEenna's dissent, 192 S. E. 393 (W. Va. 1937).
a 79 W. Va. 322, 91 S. E. 7 (1916), cited with approval in Artrip v. Peters,
114 W. Va. 819, 174 S. E. 524 (1934).
7 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUmEN's LAw § 57; V.
VA. REV. CoDE (1931) e. 47, art.
2W. VA. RE. CODE (1931) c. 47, art. 6,

4, § 7.

8 Eskridge v. Thomas, 79 W. Va. 322, 91 S. E. 7 (1916); Notes (1920) 5
A. L. R. 1447; (1935) 95 A. L. R. 735. Is not the statute though enforced a
nullityl Since the lender can in any case get back his original investment plus
legal interest, he is almost encouraged to take his chances at collecting the
usurious interest too. See Sabine v. Paine, 223 N. Y. 401, 119 N. E. 849
(1918). In New York the whole note is forfeited for usury. Therefore the
argument carries more weight. See Baker v. Butcher, 106 Cal. App. 358, 289
Pac. 236 (1930) pointing out this distinction. See also Davenport v. Kendrick,
148 Va. 479, 139 S. E. 295 (1927) in which the defense was not allowed against
a holder in due course because the statute did not make the excess void but
illegal consideration.
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in the principal case by holding that the notes in the hands of
the defendants were tainted with usury recognized that part of the
obligations. they held were void. By analogy to the reasoning
above mentioned, laches cannot make enforceable what is from the
beginning by statute unenforceable.
It is admitted in the case that had defendants sued on the
notes, the plaintiff would have had his defense. The holders' means
of enforcing their claim, i. e., by sale under the deed of trust, therefore determines the amount of protection the borrower receives.
It is submitted that sections seven and eight, article six, chapter
forty-seven of the Code were meant to give equal protection in the
alternative.
Should the policy against usury be stronger than the policy in
favor of the innocent purchaser of negotiable paper? This case
may be the proper compromise -allow
recovery of the usury
from the actual wrongdoer thereby (theoretically) protecting the
borrower, but protect the innocent purchaser of the notes. There
were at least two logical means open to the court to reach this result. First, it might have expressly repudiated the doctrine of
Eskridge v. Thomas.9 Secondly, it might have on the authority of
Davisson v. Smiti 10 treated the sets of notes as divisible, the principal series valid and the subordinate void. The usury already
having been paid there was open to the plaintiff only an action to
recover it.
F. W. L.

9 79 W. Va. 322, 9i S. E. 7 (1916). The legislature's action in passing c.
55, art. 9, § 6 in 1931 overruling Twentieth Street Bank v. Jacobs, 74 W. Va.
525, 82 S. E. 320 (1914) in which a defense of illegal consideration was allowed
against an innocent holder lends moral support to such action.
10 60 W. Va. 413, 418, 55 S. E. 466 (1906), "Though the taking of a separatd
obligation for the excess of interest above the legal rate, does not free the
entire transaction from the taint of usury, (29 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law 484)
still no reason for holding that the parties cannot determine, or have not determined, what particular payment or obligation shall represent, or be regarded
as made on account of, the usurious interest, is perceived, and, moreover, there
are well considered decisions which assert, not only that it can be and is done,
but also that the courts will recognize the binding force of such stipulations, and
treat the particular payment as one of usurious interest co nomine." Bowers
v. Douglass, 9 Tenn. 376 (1859) for clear exposition of the doctrine applied
to a law like the West Virginia law and facts similar to those in the principal
case. See also 1 JoYcE, DEFENSES TO CoMEcIAL PAPER (2d ed. 1924) § 467.
Contra: id. at 638.
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